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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3 (2) (I) (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. DID THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY UPHOLD AND 
APPLY THE STANDARD SET FORTH IN HUTCHISON 
V. HUTCHISON, 649 P. 2d 38 (Utah 1982) IN 
DETERMINING THAT THE PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE BE 
AWARDED CUSTODY OF HIS NATURAL SON OVER THE 
CHILD'S GRANDMOTHER AND STEP-GRANDFATHER? 
Standard of Review: The standard of review to be applied 
in custody cases is whether or not the trial court's holding 
was clearly erroneous. See Kishpaugh v. Kishpaugh, 745 P.2d 
1248 ( Utah 1987) citing Lemon v. Coates, 735 P.2d 58, 60 
(Utah 1987) and Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 149-50 & n.l 
(Utah 1987) . The weight that the trial court gives to the 
various factors set forth in Hutchison is to be reviewed under 
an abuse of discretion standard. See Hutchison v. Hutchison at 
41. 
II. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING THE 
DEFENDANT'S/APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION? 
Standard of Review. In considering a trial court's 
decision to deny a new trial this court will reverse only if 
there is an abuse of discretion by the trial court. Crookston 
v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 860 P.2d 937 (Utah 1993) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action arose out of a paternity action filed by Mr. 
Duncan, the plaintiff/appellee in 1991 for the purposes of 
establishing that he was in fact the natural father of Clel 
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Howard who was born on October 12, 1988. The paternity action 
was filed after such time as the natural mother Eileen Howard, 
refused visitation to Mr. Duncan on the basis of her claim 
that he was not the father of the child. It was established 
that Mr. Duncan was in fact the natural father of the child 
and visitation resumed until April 7, 1992 at which time the 
child went to Pennsylvania to live with Sandra and Larry 
Thorderson, defendants/appellants, his maternal grandmother 
and step-grandfather. 
On or about February 2, 1993 Mr. Duncan filed a Motion 
for Order to Show Cause in the Third Judicial District court, 
Salt Lake County, asking for temporary custody of the child. 
(R. 53) . On or about February 12, 1993 the 
defendants/appellants filed a petition for custody of the 
child in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, State 
of Pennsylvania where they obtained a custody order at that 
time. A consultation between the Utah and Pennsylvania court 
resulted in a decision that Utah would retain jurisdiction 
over the matter of the custody of Clel Howard. (R. at 58, 64). 
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The Thorderson's joined in as a defendant in the Utah action 
at that time. (R. 95). 
On or about June 17, 1993 a hearing was held on Mr. 
Duncan's Order to Show Cause. It was held at that time that 
the child would remain with the Thordersons during the 
pendency of the action but that he would travel to Utah for a 
one month visitation period. (R. 101-05) . Mr. Duncan, along 
with his current wife did travel to Pennsylvania in order to 
pick the child up for the one month visitation. Although the 
child was initially not allowed to leave with the Duncans, 
eventually the Duncans were able to transport the child back 
to Utah for the period of visitation. 
This matter went to trial before the Honorable Judge John 
A. Rokich on or about September 28, 29 and 30 of 1994. After 
taking the testimony of numerous witnesses including 
therapists, the parties themselves and other family members of 
the parties, the trial court applied the standard set forth in 
Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1982) and granted 
custody of the minor child to the natural father Jerome Duncan 
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subject to visitation rights of the appellants. The court 
further ordered that the child be transferred to Utah in June 
of 1995 after the completion of the current school year; that 
the Duncans obtain a therapist for the child and that the 
therapists work together in preparing the child for a change 
in custody. Further, the child was to continue in therapy once 
in Utah in order to aide him in his adjustment to living with 
his father and step-mother. The defendants/appellants filed a 
motion for reconsideration on or about December 12, 1994. The 
trial court filed a minute entry on or about January 10, 1995 
denying said motion. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law were entered by the trial court on or about February 8, 
1995 and a timely notice of appeal was filed in this matter. 
Custody of the minor child was transferred to Mr. and 
Mrs. Duncan on or about June 25, 1995. The child has been in 
therapy since that time with Dr. Chris K. Wehl. Visitation has 
proceeded with the appellants, who have remained in Utah since 
the transfer of custody, pursuant to the visitation schedule 
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recommended by Dr. Wehl and approved by the trial court by 
Amended Order in or about September of 1995. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Jerry Duncan, the natural father of Clel Howard, and 
Eileen Howard, the natural mother of Clel, met in the Fall of 
1987 at the Grand Canyon, North Rim where they were both 
employed. (Trial Transcript at 77). At the end of the season 
the couple moved to Cedar City, Utah where they moved into an 
apartment together. Both of the parties obtained work at Brian 
Head Ski Resort. After a period of approximately five months 
Mr. Duncan got a job out of state and the parties split up. 
See id. at 79. Shortly thereafter Mr. Duncan moved to Texas. 
On or about January 17, 1989 Mr. Duncan received a letter in 
Texas from Eileen Howard. The letter stated that Clel Howard 
had been born on October 12, 1988 and that Mr. Duncan was the 
father. At this time Mr. Duncan immediately quit his job in 
Texas and returned to Utah. He also sent a check for $150.00 
to Ms. Howard before leaving Texas for the support of their 
son. See id. at 82-83. 
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Upon moving back to Utah Mr. Duncan obtained employment 
and began establishing a relationship with his young son. At 
that time Clel and his mother were living with the 
defendants/appellants Mr. and Mrs. Thorderson. Over the next 
few months Mr. Duncan continued to send support checks and 
began visiting with the child. He attempted to visit the child 
once a week but on some occasions the Thordersons would not 
allow him to visit with Clel stating that he was taking a nap 
or that the timing was bad. See id. at 89. The Thordersons 
would not allow Mr. Duncan to expand the visits or take Clel 
overnight. See id. at 104-05. During this same time period Mr. 
Duncan also filed an acknowledgment of paternity with the 
Department of Social Services. See id. In or about 1991 the 
Thordersons moved to the state of Pennsylvania and Clel stayed 
in Utah with his mother. During this time period Mr. Duncan 
had a greater amount of visitation with Clel including 
overnight visits and family outings. See id. at 103. 
In 1991 Mr. Duncan filed an action to establish paternity 
in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County. At 
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that time the child's mother was denying that Mr. Duncan was 
the natural father of the child. After Mr. Duncan filed the 
action to establish paternity the defendant/appellant Howard 
cut off all visitation between Mr. Duncan and his son. See id. 
at 107. During the three month period it took to complete the 
blood tests Mr. Duncan was not allowed to visit Clel. After 
Mr. Duncan's paternity was established he discovered that Clel 
and his mother had gone to Pennsylvania to live with the 
defendants/appellants Thordersons. See id. at 108. At this 
time Mr. Duncan filed an action for visitation with his son. 
The trial court granted visitation and Mr. Duncan flew the 
child and his mother from Pennsylvania on two occasions during 
the summer of 1992 in order to have visitation with his son. 
See id. At the time of the second visit defendant/appellant 
Howard decided to stay in Salt Lake with Clel. From that time 
until Thanksgiving of 1992 Mr. Duncan had regular visitation 
with his son including overnight visitation. See id. at 111. 
In November of 1992 Mr. Duncan was informed that Clel 
would be going to Pennsylvania for the Holidays in order to 
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visit the Thordersons. After Christmas of 1992 Clel Howard 
unexpectedly did not return to Utah, but rather stayed in 
Pennsylvania with the defendants/appellants. It was this 
action on the part of the defendants that led to the filing of 
the complaint in this action on behalf of Mr. Duncan seeking 
custody of his son. See id. at 116-17. 
In the Summer of 1993 Mr. and Mrs. Duncan traveled to 
Pennsylvania to bring Clel to Utah for a one month visitation 
per the order of Judge Rokich.1 Mr. Duncan was to pick the 
child up on July 15, 1993 and transport him back to Utah for 
the court ordered visitation. After arriving in Pennsylvania 
the Thordersons refused to let Mr. Duncan take Clel and it was 
not until after a hearing was held on July 23, 1993 in 
Pennsylvania that Mr. Duncan was allowed to take his son back 
to Utah for the visitation. See id. at 118-19. When Clel first 
arrived in Utah he was somewhat anxious. He had some trouble 
eating and getting to sleep. However, as his stay progressed 
he appeared to improve. See id. at 120-121. During this time 
*Mr. Duncan married his current wife Diane Duncan on March 10, 
1993. 
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Mr. Duncan had his son evaluated by Todd Otanez who prepared 
a custody evaluation concluding that Mr. Duncan was the proper 
party to have custody of the child. See id. at 33-34. Although 
Mr. Otanez was hired to do an evaluation comparing Mr. Duncan 
to Ms. Howard, he stated at trial that he did meet with Mr. 
and Mrs. Thorderson and took their position into account in 
making his determination. See id. at 20. Mr. Otanez went so 
far as to state that one of the reasons that he was 
recommending that custody go to Mr. Duncan as opposed to Ms. 
Howard was that placing the child with Ms. Howard would be the 
same as placing him with the Thordersons. See id. at 34. Mr. 
Otanez testified at trial regarding Mr. Duncan's bond with the 
child and his sensitivity to the child's needs. He testified 
that Mr. Duncan had good parenting skills, that he tried very 
hard to be uin tune to Clel's emotional needs", that he was 
sensitive and that he had established a good bond with the 
child. See id. at 22-24. Mr. Otanez further visited Mr. 
Duncan's home and spoke with friends and relatives. Although 
Mr. Otanez did not have the time to spend with the child that 
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some of the other counselors had due to logistics, he 
completed a very thorough evaluation of the situation which 
the trial court clearly took into consideration. 
During the trial in this matter there was also lengthy 
testimony from many of Mr. Duncan's family members. All of Mr. 
Duncan's family testified about the close relationship between 
Mr. Duncan and Clel when they were able to spend time 
together. They further testified about the closeness of the 
Duncan family in general and expressed their wish to have Clel 
as a member of the extended family. See id. at 169-330. Mr. 
Duncan himself further testified about the emotional problems 
that his son experiences. He testified regarding the efforts 
he had gone to in order to find a therapist for Clel and 
discussed his concern that Clel have one doctor he could work 
with as opposed to many. See id. at 122. Mr. Duncan testified 
about the difficulty in reestablishing the bond with Clel 
after lengthy separations and the steps he had taken to make 
this transition easier. See id. at 125-26. He further 
testified about his current wife and the fact that she and 
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Clel have a very good and comfortable relationship. See id. at 
127. Lastly, Mr. Duncan testified regarding his financial and 
living situation which appeared to be quite adequate for 
raising a child. He testified that he and his wife would be 
arranging their work schedules so one of them could be with 
Clel at almost all times. The need for surrogate care was 
virtually non-existent, however, Mr. Duncan testified that he 
had made arrangements with a neighbor lady who ran a day care 
in case the need were to arise. See id. at 128-130. 
During the course of the trial there was also testimony 
from the defendants and their experts who all concluded that 
the child should remain in Pennsylvania. This testimony was 
based primarily on a best interest of the child standard 
although there was some testimony that the defendants felt 
that they had adequately rebutted the Hutchison requirements 
due to their belief that Mr. Duncan did not have a strong bond 
with the child and did not understand his needs. 
After the three day trial in this matter was concluded 
Judge Rokich found that the defendants had not rebutted the 
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presumption set forth in Hutchison and that Mr. Duncan could 
provide a good home for the child. The trial court made 
extensive Findings of Fact and concluded that custody was to 
be awarded to Mr. Duncan. The defendants filed a motion for 
reconsideration which the court denied on or about January 10, 
1995. The final Findings were signed on or about February 8, 
1995. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court in this matter properly applied the 
presumption set forth in Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38 
(Utah, 1982) in awarding custody to Mr. Duncan, the 
plaintiff/appellee. The defendants in this matter did not 
rebut the presumption that it is in the best interest of the 
child to reside with a natural parent as opposed to a non-
parent unless the non-parent demonstrates that there is no 
strong mutual bond between the child and the parent, that the 
parent has not demonstrated a willingness to sacrifice his or 
her own interest and welfare for the child's, and that the 
parent lacks the sympathy for and understanding of the child 
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that is characteristic of parents generally. Only when these 
standards are rebutted will the court then turn to an analysis 
that depends solely on the "best interest of the child77 
standard. To argue that this standard was rebutted as 
appellants Thorderson attempt to do, or that a "best interest 
of the child77 standard should have been used in place of the 
Hutchison standard as appellant Howard attempts to do is 
erroneous. Further, the case of State ex rel. H.R.V., 278 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 13 (Ut. Ct. App. 1995) is distinguishable on its 
facts from the case at hand and does not change the standard 
implemented by the court below. The trial court did not commit 
error in refusing to grant custody to Eileen Howard and 
lastly, the trial court did not commit error in denying the 
defendants/appellants motion for reconsideration. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DID THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY UPHOLD AND 
APPLY THE STANDARD SET FORTH IN HUTCHISON 
V. HUTCHISON, 649 P. 2d 38 (Utah 1982) IN 
DETERMINING THAT THE PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE BE 
AWARDED CUSTODY OF HIS NATURAL SON OVER THE 
CHILD'S GRANDMOTHER AND STEP-GRANDFATHER? 
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A. Standard of Review: 
The standard of review to be applied in custody cases is 
whether or not the trial court's holding was clearly 
erroneous. See Kishpaugh v. Kishpaugh, 745 P.2d 1248 ( Utah 
1987) citing Lemon v. Coates, 735 P.2d 58, 60 (Utah 1987) and 
Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 149-50 & n.l (Utah 1987). The 
weight that the trial court gives to the various factors set 
forth in Hutchison is to be reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard. See Hutchison v. Hutchison at 41. 
B. Discussion: 
The case law in Utah developing the legal standards to be 
used in determining the custody of a child is rather extensive 
and has resulted in a body of law that gives trial courts 
relatively clear guidelines on making these weighty decisions. 
This Court and the Utah Supreme Court have also been willing 
to change the standards previously set forth in custody 
disputes in order to keep the best interest of the child in 
mind. For many years Utah law presumed that all other things 
being equal the mother was the preferred parent in custody 
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disputes. However in Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986) 
the Utah Supreme Court determined that this presumption should 
no longer apply because in many cases "all things being equal" 
the father was still the most appropriate custodial parent. As 
our society has changed over the past decade we are now faced 
with situations where many children are not raised by two 
parent families and custody disputes more often are between 
not just parents but also extended family members or step-
family. We are also unfortunately faced with the situation 
many times where children are born out of wedlock resulting in 
a situation where one of the natural parents may not be in the 
position to establish the type of early bond with the child 
that they would have otherwise. This is the situation that 
faces this Court in the case of Clel Howard. 
As is stated above, Clel Howard was born in October of 
1988 as the result of a relationship between his mother, 
Eileen Howard and his father, Jerry Duncan. Mr. Duncan was not 
aware of the pregnancy, or the birth until some three months 
after his son was born. As stated above, at this time he 
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immediately quit his job in Texas and returned to Utah so that 
he could begin to establish a relationship with his son. He 
paid child support and attempted to visit his young son as 
much as he possibly could given the circumstances between 
himself and the child's mother. He quickly discovered that not 
only did he have to deal with the child's mother but that he 
must also deal with the child's maternal grandmother and step-
grandfather because this is where the child was spending most 
of his time. Even though it was difficult to arrange 
visitation, and the Thordersons would not allow overnight 
visitation, Mr. Duncan always continued to build and maintain 
a relationship with his son. After the Thordersons moved to 
Pennsylvania this became easier due to the fact that the 
child's mother allowed Mr. Duncan overnight and extended 
visitation. 
It was not until the child moved to Pennsylvania 
permanently that Mr. Duncan began the process of trying to 
seek custody of his son. By this time Mr. Duncan had remarried 
and obtained steady employment. It became apparent at that 
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time that the only way he would be able to establish the type 
of relationship that he wanted with his son was by seeking 
full custody of him. It was this background that lead to the 
case at hand between Mr. Duncan, the Thordersons and Ms. 
Howard. 
In Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38 (Utah, 1982), the 
Utah Supreme Court set forth the standard to be used when 
making a custody determination between a parent and a 
nonparent. 
In a controversy over custody, the 
paramount consideration is the best 
interest of the child but where one party 
to the controversy is a nonparent, there is 
a presumption in favor of the natural 
parent. Walton v. Coffman, 110 Utah 1, 169 
P.2d 97 (1946). This presumption recognizes 
"the natural right and authority of the 
parent to the child's custody. . . ." State 
in re Jennings, 20 Utah 2d 50, 52, 432 P.2d 
879, 880 (1967). It is rooted in the common 
experience of mankind, which teaches that 
parent and child normally share a strong 
attachment or bond for each other, that a 
natural parent will normally sacrifice 
personal interest and welfare for the 
child's benefit, and that a natural parent 
is normally more sympathetic and 
understanding and better able to win the 
confidence and love of the child than 
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anyone else. Walton v. Coffman, 110 Utah at 
13, 169 P.2d at 103. 
Id. at 40. Although the Utah Supreme Court was clear on the 
fact that residing with a natural parent should be presumed to 
be in the best interest of the child they did set forth that 
the presumption is not conclusive. It is accurate that there 
may be situations where a nonparent is the better custodian of 
the child, however, this presumption is not easily rebutted. 
The appellants in this case go to great length to argue that 
the Thordersons, or Eileen Howard and the Thordersons combined 
are the better parents in this case because they are the ones 
that have had this child for a significant portion of his 
life. They argue that the appellants have a deeper love for 
this child than the father, that they are more sensitive to 
his needs and that they are in a better position financially 
to provide for this child. The Hutchison Court makes it clear 
that this is not enough to overcome the presumption in favor 
of the natural parent. 
The parental presumption is not conclusive, 
. . . but it cannot be rebutted merely by 
demonstrating that the opposing party 
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possesses superior qualifications, has 
established a deeper bond with the child, 
or is able to provide more desirable 
circumstances. If the presumption could be 
rebutted merely by evidence that a 
nonparent would be a superior custodian, 
the parent's natural right to custody could 
be rendered illusory and with it the 
child's natural right to be reared, where 
possible, by his or her natural parent. 
Id. at 41. 
This is a particularly important consideration in cases 
like the one at hand where the natural parent has been 
deprived of the ability to rear his child through no fault of 
his own. When a child is born out of wedlock it is typical 
that the child not live with the natural father during his or 
her early years. In this case Mr. Duncan quit his job in Texas 
immediately upon learning of the birth of his son and moved to 
Utah so that he could establish a relationship with the child. 
The fact that the natural mother in this case chose to abandon 
the child leaving him primarily in the care of his 
grandparents plays no part in rebutting the presumption that 
rightfully belongs to Mr. Duncan. 
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In order for a nonparent to rebut the presumption they 
must rebut three characteristics set forth by the court. Only 
when the non-parent demonstrates by evidence that the natural 
parent lacks all three of these characteristics will the 
presumption be rebutted and then the "contestants for custody 
compete on equal footing, and the custody award should be 
determined solely by reference to the best interest of the 
child." Id. at 41. The three characteristics which must be 
demonstrated by the nonparent in order to rebut the 
presumption are that 1) no strong mutual bond exists between 
the child and the natural parent, 2) the natural parent has 
not demonstrated a willingness to sacrifice his or her own 
interest and welfare for the child's, and 3) that the natural 
parent lacks the sympathy for and understanding of the child 
that is characteristic of parents generally. The appellants in 
this matter did not demonstrate by evidence that the 
plaintiff/appellee lacked these three characteristics and 
therefore the trial court was proper in its ruling that the 
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best interest of the child in this case was served by awarding 
custody to Mr. Duncan, the child's natural father. 
A. The Appellants Pid Not Demonstrate 
That A Bond Does Not Exist Between the 
Child And His Natural Father. 
Mr. Duncan did in fact establish a bond with his son in 
spite of the obstacles that he was faced with. During the 
trial there was testimony from numerous witnesses who were 
able to speak about the relationship between Mr. Duncan and 
Clel. Kenneth Duncan, Mr. Duncan's brother testified about 
interactions he had observed between the appellee and his son. 
He testified that Mr. Duncan had brought Clel to many family 
activities and that their interactions were very typical of 
any father and son. (Trial Transcript at 171). He testified 
that Mr. Duncan and Clel would ride bikes together and that 
Mr. Duncan was exceptionally loving and tender towards his 
son. See id. He further testified that when Clel was not with 
his father that Mr. Duncan would speak of him often and show 
pictures to the family. See id. at 172. He testified that Clel 
always seemed to be having fun when he was around the family 
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and in fact it was almost surprising that the situation 
appeared so normal and that Clel was so close and loving with 
the extended family given his limited opportunities to spend 
time with them. See id. at 173-74. 
The trial court also heard testimony from Peggy Duncan, 
Mr. Duncan's sister-in-law who testified that Mr. Duncan had 
brought Clel to visit almost every time he had him in his 
custody. She testified that Clel was shy when he was little 
and that his father would stay right with him and get down on 
the floor and play with him and was always very excited to 
have Clel with him. She further testified that Clel appeared 
just as excited to be with his father. See id. at 182. She 
also testified that she thought it was amazing that Clel 
appeared so comfortable around his father given the fact that 
they were not able to see each other very often. See id. at 
183. 
Mr. Duncan's brother Stuart Duncan also testified at 
trial regarding the relationship between the plaintiff and his 
son. He testified that Mr. Duncan was a very good father, 
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always very concerned about his son. He further testified that 
the relationship between Clel and his father appeared to be 
quite normal and that Clel would always go to his father first 
if he needed something. He testified that Mr. Duncan was good 
at disciplining Clel and that when Clel was not with him he 
spoke of him all the time. See id. at 320. 
The appellants point out that the experts in this case 
testified that there was a stronger bond between the child and 
the Thordersons than between the child and his father. Given 
the fact that this child had spent most of his life in the 
home of the Thordersons it would make sense that his primary 
bond would exist with them. However, the fact that they may 
have a stronger bond with the child does not rebut the 
question of whether or not the father also has a bond with the 
child. Mr. Otanez testified that Mr. Duncan did in fact have 
a bond with his child. See id. at 27. Mr. Otanez did point out 
that Mr. Duncan had not had the opportunity to establish the 
type of bond with his son that one might normally expect but 
that it was clear he wanted custody of his son for "no other 
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reason except that he has that desire, that responsibility in 
his mind to protect and care and love his son." Id. Mr. Otanez 
further testified that it appeared to him that Clel made 
negative comments about his father because he knew that he was 
not supposed to have a good time when he was with his father. 
Id. at 26. However, when Clel didn't know he was being watched 
he would laugh and play with his father in a normal manner. 
Id. 
The appellants Thordersons point out testimony of Steven 
Richfield and Bryne Rivlin. Ms. Rivlin testified that the 
appellants were distrustful of Mr. Duncan. She further 
testified however, that Mr. Duncan was very appreciative of 
the Thordersons taking care of his son and felt that they were 
good people. She testified that Mr. Duncan had attempted to 
maintain contact with his son while Clel was in Pennsylvania 
but felt that the Thordersons had thwarted that effort. See 
id. at 231. Ms. Rivlin also testified that Mr. Duncan told her 
that Clel behaved differently when the Thordersons were not 
there and that he was afraid to show love to his father in 
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front of the Thordersons. See id. at 233. Although Dr. 
Richfield testified that the child's psychological bond was 
with the Thordersons he also testified that Mr. Duncan was 
establishing a bond with his son. See id. at 417. 
Based upon the testimony the trial court found that 
although the child's strongest bond was with the Thordersons, 
that Mr. Duncan's bonding with the child had been hampered 
because he had not had the opportunities to establish a bond 
in the way that the Thordersons had. The court found that Mr. 
Duncan had met with much resistance in establishing a close 
relationship with his son and that all of the evidence in the 
case established that a bond did exist between father and son 
and led the court to believe that a strong bond could and 
would be established if the opportunity was available. Based 
upon the court's findings regarding this issue it is clear 
that the court considered the testimony and found that the 
appellants did not demonstrate the first characteristic 
necessary to rebut the presumption set forth in Hutchison. 
26 
B. The Appellants Did Not Demonstrate 
That Mr. Duncan Was Not Willing To 
Sacrifice His Own Interest And Welfare 
For That Of The Child, 
It is clear from the evidence presented at trial that Mr. 
Duncan has and continues to sacrifice his own interests and 
welfare for that of his child. Mr. Duncan began sacrificing 
for his child immediately upon learning of his birth by 
quitting his job and moving to Utah in order that he could be 
close to the child. Further, upon learning of the birth of his 
child he sent a check to Ms. Howard and has continued to pay 
support on behalf of this child even though there has never 
been a court order in place directing him to do so. (Trial 
Transcript at 82) . Upon returning to Utah, even though Mr. 
Duncan was faced with obstacles in establishing a relationship 
with his son he continued to have as much contact with the 
child as possible. By reviewing the testimony it becomes 
apparent that there has never been a period in this child's 
life when his father did not continue to try and build a 
relationship with him. Even when the child was moved to 
Pennsylvania, Mr. Duncan paid for the child and his mother to 
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return to Utah for visits and even drove to Pennsylvania on 
one occasion to pick the child up and drive him back to Utah 
for visitation. See id. at 108-120. 
Mr. Duncan voluntarily registered his paternity with the 
state and underwent blood tests when Ms. Howard refused to 
recognize him as the father. See id. at 107. Mr. Duncan has 
hired numerous therapists to try and help him deal with the 
problems of his son both before and after the transfer of 
custody. No one in this case testified that Mr. Duncan's 
motives in seeking custody of his son were anything but pure. 
The simple fact that Mr. Duncan has gone to the time and 
expense of a trial and now an appeal in this matter 
demonstrates that he is willing to sacrifice for the interest 
of his son. Further, Mr. Duncan testified at trial that if he 
were awarded custody of his son he and his current wife would 
change their job schedules so someone could be home with Clel 
at all times even though this would mean spending much less 
time with each other. See id. at 128-130. 
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The evidence presented at trial was overwhelming that Mr. 
Duncan has in fact sacrificed his interests and welfare for 
his son. The only testimony to the contrary was from the 
Thordersons and Eileen Howard. The trial court, who is in the 
best position to weigh the credibility of the witnesses found 
that Mr. Duncan had ''demonstrated a willingness to sacrifice 
his own interest and welfare for the child's." The court 
further found that u[i]t is evident that plaintiff cared about 
Clel and is willing to sacrifice his own interests for the 
child's, however, the defendants were not cooperative and did 
not further a father/son relationship between Clel and 
plaintiff." (Memorandum Decision at 5). 
C. The Appellants Did Not Demonstrate 
That Mr. Duncan Lacks Sympathy For And 
Understanding Of His Son, 
The third characteristic set forth in Hutchison is that 
the nonparent must demonstrate that the natural parent lacks 
sympathy and understanding for the minor child. The appellants 
in this matter did not meet this requirement in order to rebut 
the presumption that the best interest of the child is in 
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being with his natural parent. The appellants argue that Mr. 
Duncan does not have an understanding of Clel's unique 
emotional and psychological problems and that a change in 
custody will damage this child forever. The evidence presented 
at trial showed that Mr. Duncan does in fact have an 
understanding of his child's unique situation and the trial 
court found as such. 
Mr. Duncan has put much time in effort into dealing with 
the problems faced by his son. He has always been willing to 
consult with therapists chosen by the appellants and has 
further consulted numerous therapists on his own. The 
testimony at trial did not show anything different. The only 
comment about Mr. Duncan's lack of cooperation came from Mr. 
Stewart Smith who testified that the plaintiff had said he did 
not want to take a lengthy personality test although he did 
consent to a shorter version of the test. (See Trial 
Transcript at 368) . It is important to note that Mr. Smith 
spent a limited amount of time in this case only seeing the 
participants for a total of nine hours. Even with this limited 
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contact however he did testify that the interactions between 
father and son were good although awkward because they all 
took place in his office. See id. at 360, 362-63). 
The appellants also cite to Dr. Richfield for the 
proposition that the plaintiff lacks sympathy for his son. 
Interestingly, even Dr. Richfield was willing to state that 
many of the problems faced by this child come from the fact 
that he was abandoned by his mother, defendant/appellant 
Eileen Howard. See id. at 419, 451-52. Further, Dr. Richfield 
was not hired to perform a custody evaluation in this case, 
rather he was hired by the Thordersons as a therapist for 
Clel. Dr. Richfield testified that he was not able to make any 
judgment on Mr. Duncan's parenting abilities and his 
recommendation that the Thordersons retain custody was based 
on the fact that it would be detrimental to remove this child 
from his present environment.2 See id. at 450. 
2
 It is of interest to note that Clel Howard's current 
therapist, Dr. Chris Wehl believes that the emotional problems 
suffered by this child are no greater than any other child in this 
situation. 
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After hearing the testimony in this matter the trial 
court found that there was no significant evidence that the 
plaintiff lacked the sympathy and understanding of the child 
that is characteristic of parents generally. If fact, the 
trial court further found that "plaintiff understands the 
problems that have been created by Clel being born out of 
wedlock, the abandonment of Clel by his mother, and the lack 
of regular visitation by him with Clel." (Memorandum Decision 
at 5) . 
D. The Court Did Not Err in its Refusal 
TQ Place The Parties On Equal Footing 
And Rely On A Strict Best Interest Of 
The Child Standard. 
The appellants in this case argue that the trial court 
did not implement a best interest of the child standard in 
determining custody and they go on to cite numerous cases 
which outline the issues to be considered when making a 
determination regarding the best interest of the child. The 
trial court in the matter did in fact implement a best 
interest of the child standard as is required in Hutchison v. 
Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1982) . However, under Hutchison 
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it is presumed that the best interest of the child lies in 
being placed with a natural parent over a non-parent unless 
the non-parent rebuts that presumption as discussed above. The 
trial court found that the Thordersons did not rebut this 
presumption and therefore the best interest of the child was 
in being placed with his natural father. It is only after that 
presumption is rebutted that "the contestants for custody 
compete on equal footing, and the custody award should be 
determined solely by reference to the best interests of the 
child." Id. at 40. As discussed at length above the 
Thordersons clearly did not rebut this presumption. 
Both appellants Thorderson and Howard rely heavily on the 
case Tuckey v. Tuckey, 649 P.2d 88 (Utah 1982) which was 
issued almost simultaneously with the Hutchison decision. 
Appellants rely on this case for the proposition that there 
may be circumstances where the best interest of the child lies 
in being placed with the child's grandparents. Although this 
proposition is undoubtedly true, the appellants completely 
ignore the fact that the Supreme Court of Utah remanded the 
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Tuckey case in order that the trial court could make findings 
regarding the presumption set forth in Hutchison. In the 
Tuckey case the natural mother was fighting for custody of her 
two children with the paternal grandparents. The trial court 
found that both the mother and grandparents were fit but 
awarded custody to the mother. The grandparents appealed 
arguing that the proper standard to be applied was the best 
interest of the child notwithstanding the relative fitness of 
the parties. The Utah Supreme Court reversed and remanded 
holding that the trial court had made no findings regarding 
whether or not the grandparents had rebutted the Hutchison 
presumption. The Court held that u[w]ithout specific findings, 
we cannot properly review the trial court's order. . . ." 
Tuckey at 90. Only if the presumption had been rebutted would 
the best interest of the child standard be implemented in the 
way requested by the grandparents. In the case at hand the 
trial court made lengthy and specific findings regarding the 
Hutchison presumption concluding that the grandparents had not 
rebutted the presumption and the best interest of the child 
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was in having custody placed with Mr. Duncan, his natural 
father. 
The appellants cite numerous other cases in support of 
their proposition that the trial court should have implemented 
solely a best interest of the child standard, however, all of 
these cases are factually distinguishable from the one at 
hand. In Paryzek v. Paryzek, 176 P.2d 78 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
the custody dispute was between two natural parents and the 
children had been living with the father. The trial court 
granted custody to the mother. This Court reversed and 
remanded holding that when the call is a close one maintaining 
the present stable environment should be taken into 
consideration. The Hutchison presumption was not an issue in 
this case. 
In both Moon v. Moon, 790 P. 2d 52 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
and Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P.2d 922 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) relied 
on by the appellants the custody dispute was between the 
natural mother and the natural father. This Court held that 
the trial court must make specific and detailed findings of 
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fact in awarding custody in these situations and remanded so 
that could be accomplished in the Sukin case and found that 
the trial court had adequately accomplished this in the Moon 
matter. 
The appellants further cite to the recent case of State 
ex re. H.R.V., 278 Adv. Rep. 13 (Ct. App. 11/22/95). This case 
is also distinguishable from the case at hand. Appellants 
argue that the H.R.V. decision does away with the parental 
presumption set forth in Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38 
(Utah 1982), in the situation where the natural parent does 
not already have custody of the minor child. This is a serious 
misreading of H.R.V. What the H.R.V. court in fact held was 
that a natural parent who had already lost custody to a 
nonparent could not then rely on the parental presumption in 
attempting to get custody back. In H.R.V. Legal custody had 
already been granted to the minor children's paternal aunt. It 
had already been determined by the trial court that the 
natural father should not have custody of the children. The 
natural father then brought a petition to change custody. In 
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that petition he attempted to rely upon the parental 
presumption. This Court held that "once the parental 
presumption has been rebutted or lost, and the natural parent 
has been deprived of custody, that parent is not entitled to 
reassert the parental presumption at a later date unless 
custody has since been restored to the parent. Id. at 15. This 
is clearly distinguishable from the case at hand. Mr. Duncan 
never lost custody of his son nor did the appellants ever 
rebut the presumption and gain custody of the child. This 
child was born out of wedlock and Mr. Duncan never had an 
opportunity to have custody of the child before now although 
he did provide support for the child and exercised visitation 
with the child. This was Mr. Duncan's first opportunity to 
rely on the parental presumption since he was never found to 
be an unfit parent and never lost custody of the child. For 
the appellants to argue that Mr. Duncan should not be awarded 
this presumption because through no fault of his own the child 
had never lived with him borders on bad faith. 
37 
E. The Trial Court Did Not Commit 
Reversible ExxQT In Refusing I Q 
Consider Any Type Of Custody Award 
Involving Howard, 
Eileen Howard, defendant/appellant, the natural mother of 
Clel Howard has maintained since the beginning of this matter 
that she in not interested in having custody of her son and it 
is her wish that custody be placed with her parents the 
Thordersons. It was not reversible error for the trial court 
in this matter to state that custody would not be granted to 
appellant Howard. The testimony at trial was consistent from 
all the experts on the point that Ms. Howard was not the 
appropriate person to have custody of the child. Mr. Todd 
Otanez testified that Ms. Howard made it very clear during his 
evaluation that "she had no intentions of being the primary 
caretaker of her son." (Trial Transcript at 30). Mr. Otanez 
further testified that when he questioned Ms. Howard about her 
feelings on being a parent to her son her response was 
"depressing". Id. Mr. Otanez also stated that raising a child 
was not what Ms Howard had in mind for her life at this time. 
See id. at 31. 
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Ms. Bryne Rivlin, a social worker who also evaluated the 
parties testified that she had only visited with Ms. Howard on 
two occasions but that there did not appear to be much bonding 
between Clel and his mother. See id. at 238-39. Ms. Rivlin 
further testified that Ms. Howard had expressed to her that 
she wanted Clel to remain with the Thordersons and that she 
was not able to take care of him. See id. at 256-57. Mr. 
Steward Smith, a social worker who had some limited contact 
with the parties in this matter testified that Ms. Howard's 
leaving the child at an early age was a contributing factor to 
his emotional problems Id. at 3 91, and as stated above Dr. 
Steven Richfield testified that many of the problems faced by 
the child were a result of his abandonment by his mother. See 
id. At 419, 451-52. Dr. Richfield further testified that the 
relationship between Ms. Howard and her son was peripheral and 
that Ms. Howard had difficulties with "attunement to Clel's 
emotional needs." Id. at 419. Dr. Richfield also testified 
that it was clear that Clel was not the uppermost priority in 
Ms. Howard's life. See id. at 426. 
39 
Ms. Howard herself testified that she had never been the 
primary caretaker of her son Id. at 542. Ms. Howard further 
testified that when her son came to Utah for visitation with 
his father in the summer of 1993 that even though she was 
living here she did not have visitation with the child because 
she was not able to handle him without her mother. See id. at 
558. Ms. Howard also testified that if she were to have 
custody of Clel that she would continue to live with the 
Thordersons who would remain the primary caretakers. See id. 
at 566. 
Appellant Howard argues that the trial court made the 
determination that she would not be given custody of the child 
without hearing any of the evidence. One can tell be reviewing 
the record below that this simply is not the case. During the 
cross examination of Ms. Howard the following exchange took 
place: 
Mr. Ellis: You mentioned that if you were 
awarded custody it would not be 
your intention to move away (from 
the Thordersons) ; is that 
correct? 
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Ms. Howard: Correct. 
The Court: Counsel, look, that's not an issue 
here, custody. I have had the 
therapists testify, the mother testify 
about custody. Let's not put this 
woman through that. It's hard enough 
for her now. Not one of them 
recommended that she have custody. Dr. 
Richfield said, no, she wasn't. Her 
mother said she wasn't. So I don't 
know why we're putting this woman 
through this. 
(Trial Transcript at 566). During closing argument a further 
exchange took place between plaintiff's counsel and the court 
regarding the possibility of custody being awarded to 
defendant/appellant Eileen Howard: 
Mr. Ellis: . . . comparing the parents it appears 
from the evidence and, we think the 
court can see that the only realistic 
choice is to award custody of that 
child to his father, the only parent 
that has his own home, and can provide 
stability. 
And frankly, for the important 
reasons, I believe that awarding 
custody to the mother, in this case 
would be essentially equivalent to 
awarding custody--
The Court: That's a finding I'll make right now 
so nobody has to argue that. I would 
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not award custody to the natural 
mother. That has come across loud and 
clear, and in good conscience I could 
not do that. 
Mr. Ellis: Thank you, Your Honor, 
The Court: So that's a finding I'm making. 
Id. at 575. 
It simply is not accurate that the trial court made a 
legal error by refusing to grant custody to appellant Howard. 
The transcript is clear that all of the experts testified that 
she was not the appropriate person to be awarded custody and 
that the court did not make this final determination until 
after hearing the testimony. 
II. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING THE 
DEFENDANT'S/APPELLANT' S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION? 
Standard of Review: 
The standard of review for a motion for reconsideration 
is the same as would be implemented in considering a trial 
court's decision to deny a new trial. This court will reverse 
only if there is an abuse of discretion by the trial court. 
Watkiss & Campbell v. FOA son, 808 P. 2d 1061 (Utah 1991) and 
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Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 860 P. 2d 937 (Utah 
1993). 
Discussion: 
The appellants in this case filed a "Motion for 
Reconsideration" on or about December 12, 1994 prior to a 
final order being entered by the trial court. In a Minute 
Entry dated January 10, 1995 the trial court denied 
appellant's motion. It was not an abuse of discretion for the 
trial court to deny such a motion. 
Although it is accurate that a judge is free to change 
his or her mind on the outcome of a case prior to a final 
decision being rendered, the rules of procedure make no 
provision for a ''motion for reconsideration" . The appellants 
claim that such a motion is allowed under Rule 59 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, however, the Supreme Court of Utah 
has already held that provisions for such a motion do not 
exist. See Watkiss & Campbell v. FOA & Son, 808 P. 2d 1061 
(Utah 1991). Rule 59 which is relied upon by the appellants 
states as follows: 
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(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of 
Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to all 
or any of the parties and on all or part of 
the issues, for any of the following 
causes; provided, however, that on a motion 
for a new trial in an action tried without 
a jury, the court may open the judgment if 
one has been entered, take additional 
testimony, amend findings of fact and 
conclusions of law or make new findings and 
conclusions, and direct the entry of a new 
j udgment: 
The rule then goes on to list some of the causes that may 
result in a new trial such as newly discovered evidence, 
excessive or inadequate damages, irregularity in the 
proceedings of the court to name a few. Nowhere does this rule 
provide for a "motion for reconsideration" . The Utah Supreme 
Court has held as follows regarding the reasons why motions to 
reconsider are inappropriate: 
If the party ruled against were permitted 
to go beyond the rules, make a motion for 
reconsideration, and persuade the judge to 
reverse himself, the question arises, why 
should not the other party who is now ruled 
against be permitted to make a motion for 
re-reconsideration asking the court to 
again reverse himself? Tenacious litigants 
and lawyers might persist in motions, 
arguments and pressures and theoretically 
a judge could go on reversing himself 
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periodically at the entreaties of one or 
the other of the parties ad infinitum. 
Watkiss & Campbell at 1064. 
The motion that the appellants should have filed in this 
matter is a motion for a new trial. However, regardless of 
what one calls the motion the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying it. The motion was filed December 12, 
1994. The trial court did not deny the motion until January 
10, 1995. With the passing of almost a full month before the 
Minute Entry it is difficult to say that Judge Rokich did not 
consider the motion of the appellants. There is no requirement 
that a judge must make findings as to why a motion for new 
trial, or in this case reconsideration, was denied. It is 
within the judge's full discretion to either grant or deny the 
motion as he or she sees fit. The trial court in this matter 
was in the best position to review the evidence and to weigh 
the credibility of the witnesses. It is clear from both the 
trial transcript and the court's Finding of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law that this was a difficult case and much 
consideration was given to its outcome. It is further clear by 
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looking at the time that passed between the end of trial and 
a final judgment being entered by the court that Judge Rokich 
did not make this decision lightly and most certainly did not 
commit an abuse of discretion. 
CQNCLUglQN 
The trial court in this matter properly applied the 
presumption that the best interest of the child lies in being 
placed with a natural parent over a non-parent. The trial 
court made complete and detailed findings that the appellant 
did not rebut this presumption and properly awarded custody to 
the plaintiff, Mr. Duncan. Further, the trial court did not 
commit error in refusing to place custody with the natural 
mother based upon the testimony at trial and lastly the trial 
court did not commit an abuse of discretion in denying 
appellants Motion for Reconsideration. The appellee in this 
matter respectfully requests that this Court affirm the 
opinion of the trial court in its entirety. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ ? — day of February, 1996. 
WENDY M/ LEWIS 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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